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A note about the illustrations: The colour pictures labelled “supplementary figures” 
are not intended to be published with the article. They are included with the paper in 




Philosophers of art use the term “seeing-in” to describe an important part of our 
experience of pictures: we often “see” a picture’s subject matter “in” its surface. This 
paper proposes that seeing-in is an example of a perceptual phenomenon that has 
received extensive attention in perceptual psychology: the perception of 
transparency. It is generally accepted that transparency perception is governed by 
laws of “scission”. I argue that seeing-in is also subject to these laws, and that seeing-
in can be understood as a kind of transparency effect. In the process I examine how 
such a proposal could account for apparent differences between seeing-in and 
transparency perception – in particular, the fact that we report that picture surfaces 
seem opaque rather than transparent – and develop a detailed alternative account of 





Philosophers disagree on the conditions that must hold for a viewer to understand a 
picture, but most agree that understanding a picture usually involves the experience of 
seeing-in: a visual awareness of the picture’s subject matter “in” the picture’s surface. 
This paper argues that seeing-in is in fact an example of a kind of visual perception 
that is relatively well-understood by perceptual psychologists: transparency 
perception. In the case of pictures, seeing-in will typically involve a visual experience 
of both picture surface and subject matter, so that the subject matter appears as if seen 
through the surface of the picture. I acknowledge that this proposal is unlikely to 
seem initially appealing: picture surfaces are not typically physically transparent, nor 
do we usually report that picture surfaces appear transparent. Rather we think we 
perceive them as they typically are, as opaque surfaces. My proposal is more subtle 
than it appears in this bald formulation – largely because transparency perception is a 
more subtle phenomenon than one might first imagine. We shall find, for instance, 
that transparency perception does not preclude our ability to see picture surfaces as 
opaque. Still, as it suggests, my proposal does call for an almost complete revision of 
the current understanding of the experience of seeing-in and by extension, of our 
experience of pictures. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. I first introduce the concept of seeing-in as it is 
presented by Richard Wollhiem, and begin to develop an understanding of it, drawing 
on the work of John Kulvicki and others, that moves away from Wollheim. I then 
discuss accounts of transparency perception. Transparency perception is an 
extensively studied topic in perceptual psychology and it is generally accepted that its 
phenomenology is governed by laws of “scission” that relate “stimulus” properties to 
the experiences they can give rise to. I use a range of images to argue that seeing-in 
should also be understood as subject to these laws, and that seeing-in should be 
understood as a kind of transparency effect. In the process I find that seeing-in is a 
less prevalent part of pictorial experience than Wollheim believed; this is something 
that transparency perception also helps illuminate. I then make a more detailed 
examination of a kind of pictorial experience I call imbrication, and its relation to the 
phenomenon of inflection which has received attention in recent philosophical writing 
on pictures. I conclude by describing the conditions that distinguish seeing-in from 




Seeing-in, Wollheim held, involves a visual awareness of a surface, Y, and also, 
simultaneously, a visual awareness of some object, X, “in” the surface.1 Thus his term 
“seeing-in”, and his talk of “seeing X in Y”. To describe the double awareness that 
seeing-in involves, Wollheim enlisted the term “twofoldness”. The twofold character 
of seeing-in contrasts with what we might call the “single fold” of ordinary visual 
perception. In his early formulation of the concept he conceived of seeing-in as 
involving two separate experiences (one of the surface, and one of the object or state 
of affairs seen in it). He later came to understand seeing-in to be a single experience 
with two aspects. It is this later conception that I address here. Seeing-in can occur 
outside the realm of human-made artefacts or arise from an accidental marking, as 
when one sees a landscape in a cloud formation, or a face in an inkblot. In neither 
case does the visual awareness of the seen-in object preclude the simultaneous 
awareness of the surfaces in which they are seen. We remain, for instance, visually 
aware of the shape, colour, and fluid character of the inkblot, at the same time as we 
see in it a grotesque face. Of special interest to Wollheim, pictures can occasion 
seeing-in – in particular, we see in them their subject matter. That is, pictures can 
occasion a visual awareness of the picture surface – the flat, drawn, printed or painted 
surface of the picture – and a simultaneous awareness of the three-dimensional 
arrangement of objects that comprises the picture’s subject matter. Wollheim claimed 
that seeing a picture’s subject matter in its surface is a necessary condition for 
understanding the picture. There is significant doubt that seeing-in is involved in 
every instance of pictorial understanding – in particular it is now widely doubted that 
trompe l’oeil painting arouses this experience – but the idea that seeing-in usually 
accompanies the understanding of pictures, and ordinarily plays a role in 




A point about the examples of seeing-in I use: I focus exclusively on seeing-in 
occasioned by pictures, and not at all on seeing-in arising from natural or accidental 
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 His early account is in Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980, supplementary essay 5. The later formulation is 
found in Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987, pp. 46–77. 
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 See, for example, Martin Kelly, ‘Richard Wollheim’s ‘Seeing-In’ and 
‘Representation’’, in Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey (ed.), 
Visual Theory, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p. 161; Jerrold Levinson, ‘Wollheim on 
Pictorial Representation’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism’, vol. 56, no. 3, 
1998, pp. 227–33; and Dominic McIver Lopes, Understanding Pictures, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 49–50. 
marks. Picture-makers have extensively and systematically explored the diverse ways 
marks can be manipulated to occasion seeing-in. By comparison, natural and 
accidental markings only exercise this ability partially and unsystematically. So it is 
to pictures that an account of seeing-in must primarily address itself if it is to be 
convincing. 
 
Wollheim would have objected to my proposal. He took seeing-in to be, like ordinary 
face-to-face seeing, an innate and “biologically grounded” capacity.3 But, at least 
according to his later view, he did not allow that the phenomenology of seeing-in 
could be understood in terms of the phenomenology of seeing. “Such a comparison”, 
he wrote, “seems easy enough to take on, but it proves impossible to carry out. The 
particular complexity that one kind of experience has and the other lacks makes their 
phenomenology incommensurate.”4 Since transparency perception is 
straightforwardly an aspect of the phenomenology of ordinary seeing (I will say more 
about this in the following section), my proposal entails that Wollheim is wrong on 
this point. I am not the only one to take issue with this incommensurability claim of 
Wollheim’s. I draw especially on John Kulvicki’s analysis here, as he brings together 
a range of such arguments, putting them to a purpose comparable in a way to my own 




Kulvicki points out that for Wollheim, each aspect of seeing-in is an “aspect of 
visual experience, and visual experience presents things as being before one’s 
eyes.”6 But how can two things, picture and subject matter, appear to be 
simultaneously before one’s eyes without seeming to be in some kind of spatial 
relationship? The fact that they both appear in a simultaneous spatial relation to 
the viewer implies that they must also be spatially related to one another. 
Kulvicki is specific about what that spatial relation is: “there is a strong sense in 
which depicted scenes seem to recede from the canvas.”7 Other considerations 
suggest the same idea. Kulvicki observes that Michael Podro and Dominic 
Lopes, among others, have elegantly described how pictures address us in our 
space, or invite our imagined interaction in theirs.
8
 That point is perhaps an 
obvious one, but here are two examples I find especially forceful. In the famous 
recruiting poster, Uncle Sam, in an arresting gesture, seems to point out of the 
picture’s space, at the viewer. Similar tricks can encourage us to imagine 
entering a picture’s space. The handle of a knife in a typical Dutch still life 
seems to points toward us, inviting us to imagine grasping it and cutting a slice 
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 Wollheim, 1987, p. 54. 
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 Wollheim, 1987, pp. 46–47. 
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 John V. Kulvicki , ‘Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-In’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 67, no. 4, 2009, pp. 387–97, at pp. 390–392. 
Although the focus of my discussion in this section is on others, it is worth noting that 
John Hyman also takes explicit issue with this statement of Wollheim’s. (John 
Hyman, The Objective Eye: Color, Form and Reality in the Theory of Art, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 142.) 
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 Kulvicki, p. 391. 
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 Kulvicki, p. 391. 
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 Kulvicki, p. 392. Kulvicki draws on Michael Podro, Depiction, Yale University 
Press, 1998, pp. 64, 71, 79, and Dominic McIver Lopes, Sight and Sensibility: 
Evaluating Pictures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 1. 
from the half-peeled fruit that seems to lie a little deeper in the picture’s space. 
Nor are such observations new. Leon Battista Alberti, the Renaissance art 
theorist, described pictures as akin to windows: 
 I will tell what I do when I paint. First of all … I inscribe a quadrangle of 
right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window 
through which I see what I want to paint.
9
 
 Again the implication is that the subject matter seems to lie behind the picture 
surface. There is an exception, which will come up again at the end of this paper: 
occasionally, depicted objects seem to occupy a space in front of the picture surface 
rather than behind it. One famous example is found in Caravaggio’s first Supper at 
Emmaus (1601, National Gallery, London), in which the surprised apostles seem to 
thrust limbs and furniture right out of the picture in their surprise.
10
 Though it is rarely 
commented on, the effect is evident in more extreme form in certain anamorphic 
pictures. The skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533, National Gallery, London), 
for instance, when seen from the correct viewpoint, appears to weirdly float some feet 
in front of the canvas. 
Kulvicki also draws on Robert Hopkins to support his position. Hopkins’ remarks are 
of particular interest because they suggest a way in which Kulvicki’s analysis can be 
refined. Hopkins observes that the viewer “can point … at marks on the [picture] 
surface, thereby identifying objects in the depicted space … without having to 
struggle”. So “although distinct”, the experiences of real space and depicted space 
“are neatly integrated”11 The phenomenon is a familiar one. If a viewer of a Last 
Judgement is asked to point out where Christ is in the depicted scene, they will have 
no trouble doing so. They point at the picture surface as if through a window, at where 
Christ seems to be within the depicted space. It is the notion of pointing that allows a 
refinement to be made to Kulvicki’s position. For when asked to point at Christ, the 
viewer not only points at the place Christ seems to be; in the process they point at 
precisely the marks on the canvas that depict Christ. Indeed, if one points at any 
depicted detail in a picture, one finds oneself also pointing at precisely those marks 
that depict it. To put it another way, when the subject matter seems to exist behind the 
picture surface the marks appear to overlap precisely those parts of the subject matter 
they depict. And in cases where subject matter appears to project in front of the 
picture surface, the depicted objects appear to overlap just the marks that depict them. 
While I follow Kulvicki in positing that seeing-in involves a visual awareness of one 
thing as seen through another, our positions diverge from here. So let me add some 
remarks about these differences. Kulvicki goes on to claim that we are visually aware 
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11
 Robert Hopkins, Picture, Image and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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of the picture surface as opaque while simultaneously seeing through it: “seeing-in is 
a perceptual state in which an opaque object is experienced as being in front of 
another opaque object even though neither object is obscured by the other.”12 In this 
respect our views directly contradict each another. The analysis that I will give shortly 
of examples of seeing-in can thus be seen as counter-examples to this claim in 
Kulvicki’s account. There is also a logical objection to his approach. So far as 
experiencing something as opaque involves not being visually aware of anything 
through it, there is a contradiction at the heart of his view. Kulvicki rejects this 





2. Introducing transparency perception 
 
The perception of transparency involves the visual perception of one object through 
another. As Fabio Metelli puts it, “[o]ne perceives transparency when one sees not 
only surfaces behind a transparent medium but also the transparent medium or object 
itself.”14 Transparency perception has received substantial attention in perceptual 
psychology. Most of this relates to the visual experience of transparency and the 
conditions a stimulus must satisfy in order to occasion it. It is this research that I will 
be referring to. Note that I am not concerned here with the neurological activities that 
underlie transparency perception, although a literature on this does exist. I will draw 
especially on Metelli’s widely cited article on the topic, which I have already quoted 
from, as well as on more recent research. I will say more on transparency perception 
later; for now let me mention three points that will be relevant to my discussion. 
 
First, transparency perception should be distinguished from physical transparency. A 
substance is physically transparency if light can be transmitted through it.
15
 Crucially 
for my proposal, transparency perception can occur without the presence of physical 
transparency.
16
 Mettelli is clear on this point, and it is worth noting that most of the 
experiments done on transparency perception since Metelli’s article do not use 
physically transparent surfaces as stimuli, but rather arrangements of coloured shapes 
that we are apt to perceive as transparent. (See, for a similar example, figure 1.) This 
is an important point for my proposal, because pictures (of course) are not generally 
physically transparent. 
 
Second, in case there is any doubt, transparency perception is a kind of ordinary 
seeing. Many visible things are physically transparent – and we perceive them as 
such, that is we see through them to whatever lies behind them. Water and mist are 
obvious examples in the natural world, and glass and many plastics are prominent 
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 Fabio Metelli, ‘The Perception of Transparency’, Scientific American, vol. 230, no. 
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 This is Metelli’s definition (Metelli, p. 91). It should be added that the transmitted 
light is not scattered, as it is with translucent materials such as frosted glass. 
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 Metelli, p. 91. The reverse is also true: physical transparency need not give rise to 
the perception of transparency in a viewer. Metelli points out that a physically 
transparent film laid in the middle of an opaque field of undifferentiated colour will 
not appear transparent. 
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examples among manufactured things. Transparency perception helps us understand 
and so negotiate our physical environment, and it is an ability that most likely evolved 
in our distant pre-human ancestors.
17
 The perceptual psychologist Patrick Cavanagh 
points out an even more common example of transparency perception, although one 
that occurs without the presence of physical transparency: shadows are perceived as 
transparent. That is, the perception of a shadowed surface is ordinarily akin to seeing 




Third, like seeing-in, the perception of transparency involves a kind of twofold 
experience. Wollheim’s twofoldness involves the simultaneous visual awareness of 
two different things, such that one appears “in” the other. It thus readily functions as a 
synonym for seeing-in. I make use of a different conception of twofoldness, that 
draws on the analysis of the previous section, and replaces the “in” with the 
requirements of overlapping and visibility that I discussed there. 
This yields the following definition: 
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 There are studies of transparency perception in animals (this is where neurological 
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 Patrick Cavanagh, ‘The Artist as Neuroscientist’, Nature, vol. 434, 2005, pp. 301–
307. Cavanagh elegantly demonstrates this by considering an instance where a 
shadow is depicted so that it appears opaque. In The Assumption of the Virgin with 
Saints Michael and Benedict by Luca Signorelli and workshop (late 1480s, New 
York, Metropolitan Museum of Art), the darkened area depicting the shadow cast by 
Saint Michael’s leg appears more like a cut out piece of grey paper laid over the 
ground than a shadow. The reason for this lies in the way the painter (perhaps a 
member of Signorelli’s workshop) manages the overlap with another shadow. The 
painting depicts Saint Michael skewering a small devil, such that the shadow of St. 
Michael’s leg is shown overlapping the shadow of the devil’s leg. Overlapping 
shadows reinforce one another (in what I describe below as subtractive colour 
mixture), so they appear darker in the area of overlap. But the colour of the shadow of 
St. Michael’s leg is not altered where it overlaps the other shadow, giving the 
impression mentioned above: that we are not seeing a cast shadow, but an opaque 
surface of the same shape laid out on the ground. 
 
Note also that shadows are not necessarily perceived as transparent. For example, in 
shadow puppetry, the shadows cast onto the screen from behind do not appear 
transparent. (I owe this point and example to an anonymous referee.) However, in 
such circumstances we do not perceive the screen as shaded. Indeed this is the 
signature effect of shadow puppetry: the shadows appear as opaque, dark animated 
bodies silhouetted by the bright ground of the screen. So perhaps shadows must be 
perceived as transparent to be experienced as shadows. 
A visual experience is twofold if and only if it is an experience of objects 
overlapping in which both overlapping and overlapped parts of the objects are 
simultaneously perceived. 
 
Thus my conception of twofoldness involves the perception of overlapping without 
the perception of occlusion. It still identifies a crucial feature of seeing-in – relating 
the two folds of a single experience. But it can no longer be taken as a synonym for 
seeing-in, for it is also obviously applicable to other experiences. In particular, it also 
describes transparency perception: we see the overlapped object through the 
transparent overlapping object, giving us a simultaneous visual awareness of both. 
(fig. 1)
19
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 This figure is intended to show one transparent surface overlapping an opaque 
surface, but some observers have told me that they see it as two transparent surfaces, 
through which the white ground can be seen. This would be an example of double 
transparency, which I discuss in section 6 (vi). 
20
 Let me address another worry upfront that might otherwise nag at the reader. One 
might wonder why this paper focuses on transparency, when there is another 
phenomenon close at hand that might seem more like seeing-in: certain kinds of 
reflection. If I see my face in, say a car bonnet, I will also likely have a twofold 
experience. That is, I see the glossy coloured surface of the bonnet, and reflected in it 
I see myself. But like most picture surfaces, reflective surfaces (such as a car bonnet) 
are often opaque, so could they give a more promising model for an account of 
seeing-in? The correct response is no. On closer examination, experiences of such 
reflections turn out to be instances of perceptual transparency. For instance, while the 
car bonnet is not physically transparent, we do have a visual awareness of it as 
transparent. The experience is much the same as if we could in fact see through the 
surface (say) a mirror version of oneself behind it (I ignore here the distortion that a 
convex reflective surface produces). The optics of such reflections involve a fusion 
mixture of the colours of the reflected surface and reflected object (reflections always 
make a surface brighter – think of the irritating reflections on a TV screen), and this 
satisfies a condition for one of the kinds of perceptual transparency that I discuss in 
section 4. 
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Figure 1. Perceptual transparency  
 
3. A challenge 
 
Let me now turn to why it is that my proposal is apt to seem counter-intuitive. As I 
have mentioned, there are two reasons for this. First is the fact that pictures are not 
usually transparent objects; rather they are made up of opaque materials: pigments, 
ink and so on. This concern can be easily dismissed. As I have said, I am not 
concerned with physical transparency here, but with the perception of transparency, 
and as we have seen, the latter can occur without the former. Second, and harder to 
dismiss, is the concern that pictures do not appear transparent. For instance, when we 
examine the brushwork of a painting, it does not seem transparent (say, glassy and 
see-through); rather it appears opaque. So too with surfaces of other kinds of pictures: 
the pen marks on a drawing usually do not seem transparent, and while watercolour 
paint may seem (and indeed be) transparent, the paper visible through it appears as it 
is, opaque. It is worth noting that Wollheim says nothing to alleviate this concern. 
“When seeing-in occurs”, he writes, “I am visually aware of the surface I look at”.21 
This does not imply any kind of unusual awareness of the surface per se. The 
remainder of the paper develops my proposal in a way that aims to address this 
challenge. Before I am able to do this, though, I first need to examine transparency 
perception more closely. 
 
4. Laws of scission 
 
According to Metelli, perception of transparent colours (both achromatic – that is, 
black, white and grey – and chromatic) is governed by a law of scission: 
 
With the perception of transparency the stimulus color splits into two 
different colors, which are called the scission colors. One of the scission 
colors goes to the transparent layer and the other to the surface of the 
figure below. … there is a simple relation between the stimulus and the 
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 Wollheim, 1987, p. 46. 





Figure 2 shows examples for achromatic colours. (i) and (ii) each give the impression 
of one transparent square overlapping another. In the areas of overlap, whose colours 
I indicate by c, one surface appears as if seen through another , that is, we perceive 
colour a seen through colour b (or vice versa). 
 
Figure 2. Achromatic transparency. 
 
This law of scission tells us that, so far as each of these diagrams do occasion this 
perception, the mixture of colours a and b is colour c. It will be apparent that this 
formula holds in different ways in (i) and (ii), for while a and b are the same tone in 
both diagrams, c is not. In (i), c is darker than both a and b, and in (ii), c is a tone 
midway between a and b. Different kinds of mixture are thus operative in each of 
these diagrams. For this reason it will be better to talk of laws (rather than a single 
law) of scission. In (i) c is a subtractive mixture of a and b; in (ii), c is a fusion 
mixture of a and b. Both kinds of mixture can produce the effect of transparency, and 
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 Metelli, p. 93. 
both correspond with instances of transparency perception in the natural world.
23
 
Fusion mixture can be observed when a disc with segments of different colours is 
spun so that these “component” colours appear to blend or “fuse” into a single colour 
that occupies a midpoint between the tone and chroma of the component colours. This 
corresponds to the transparency observed when something is seen though a haze or 
fog. Subtractive mixture is familiar from the superimposition of coloured filters or 
gels. Light passing through a coloured filter has components subtracted from it. A 
filter will subtract brightness, and may also subtract aspects of hue (a red filter, for 
instance, will tend to subtract those wavelengths that fall outside those that give rise 
to the perception of redness. This corresponds to the effects of transparency when 
shadows overlap. It is widely accepted in the literature on transparency that the same 
two kinds of mixture – fusion and subtractive mixture – will also produce chromatic 
transparency perception.
24
 It has more recently been found that other, related changes 




A similar law applies to the perception of texture. Takeo Watanabe and Cavanagh 
point out that “[w]e see textures overlapped wherever there are transparent … 
structures interposed between the viewer and a background surface.”26 They observe 
that, like colour transparency, we can often perceive this overlap not as a new 
composite texture, but as one texture seen through the other: “We are able to 
decompose one texture from another even if parts of them are overlapped.”27 Figure 3 
shows an example of texture transparency. Texture is schematically indicated by 
dashes. Where the two textures interpenetrate, we do not tend to see a new composite 
texture; rather we see one texture through the other. Texture transparency can thus be 
understood to accord with a similar law of scission, in that the mixture of the texture 
used to depict the overlap is a composite of the two textures used to depict the non-
overlapping areas. 
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 Metelli’s focus is on fusion mixture. Others have stressed subtractive mixture. (J. 
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 M. D’Zmura, P. Colantoni, K. Knoblauch and B. Laget, ‘Color Transparency’, 
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 These are described by D’Zmura et al. Fusion can be understood as a convergence 
to a point in colour space between the overlapping colours; however, “[t]he point to 
which colors converge can vary over a wide range and still lead to the perception of 
transparency.” (p. 478) Subtractive mixture can be understood as a particular kind of 
“translation” in a direction in colour space involving a decrease in luminance; but this 
decrease “is not necessary for the perception of transparency. Translation in any 
direction of color space will work.” (p. 477) 
26
 Watanabe and Cavanagh, ‘Texture Laciness: The Texture Equivalent of 
Transparency?’, Perception, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 293–303, at p. 293. 
27
 Watanabe and Cavanagh, p. 293. 
 
 
Figure 3. Texture transparency. Watanabe and Canvanagh, p. 294, fig. 1. (b). 
 
Note that these conditions are not the only ones necessary to arouse perception of 
transparency. Metelli, for instance, also identifies certain “figural” conditions for 
perceptual transparency which hold in the above examples.
28
 I will not dwell on these 
here. The kinds of examples I discuss below differ from the geometrical ‘mosaics’ 
Metelli (and most others) use to study the topic, so the figural conditions he proposes 
are not readily applicable. Nevertheless I allow that further conditions beyond those 
laws I have discussed may be required to establish the perception of transparency in 
the examples I will examine. 
 
Before moving on let me address a concern philosophers may have about the 
treatment of colour here. For Metelli, stimulus colours are the “original” colours of 
his mosaics.
29
 They are properties of surfaces such as luminance under particular 
illumination. This suggests that he identifies them with objective properties. However, 
scission colours are, in the case of Metelli’s mosaics and in other cases I will 
consider, subjective effects. This is apt to make philosophers uneasy: for how can any 
mixture of subjective effects be expected to give rise to something that accords with 
an objective measure, such as luminance? Although it is tempting to present the law 
of scission in more philosophically robust terms, I will not do so here, for this concern 
about its formulation can, with care, be put to one side. That is to say, in this context, 
the distinction between subjective and objective is not especially important. I say this 
for two reasons. First, objective properties, such as luminance, under certain 
constraints and with particular exceptions, will relatively reliably produce certain 
subjective effects (such as the perception of lightness and darkness) that accord with 
the objective state of affairs. Second, subjective colour effects can be compared to 
these veridical perceptions, and where a match occurs, we can consider the colours as 
having the same luminance. 
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Both these points are implicit in Metelli’s approach. Regarding the first point, Metelli 
allows that colours, including under certain circumstances stimulus colours, can be 
perceived truthfully. In particular, the stimulus colour can be perceived when 
transparency is not perceived (I will return to this point in the next section).
30
 Turning 
to the second point, we have seen that with the mosaics that Metelli and others use, 
the scission colours cannot be objectively measured, since they are subjective 
phenomena. But these colours can for the most part be reliably matched with coloured 
objects that do lend themselves to objective measurement, and the law of scission can 
be confirmed in this way. So in figure 2 (i), under a given illumination, the 
brightnesses of a, b and c can be readily measured objectively. However, the 
brightnesses of the scission colours, being subjective, cannot be so measured. 
Nevertheless the diagram can be used to measure these colours in another way, since 
viewers can assess whether tone c produces an impression of transparency in which 
tone a appears to be seen through tone b (or vice versa). In this way the viewer can 
assess whether the colours of the subjective scission effect match the objectively 
measurable tones a and b. 
 
Obviously, this easy movement between thinking of colour as objective and as 
subjective relies on an assumption that the objective and subjective are here closely 
linked. If that assumption is right, and I think it is in this context, the ambiguous 
approach that we find in Metelli and others will be harmless, or largely so. I think we 
must take it that this is the case, for otherwise scientists would have done away with 
this ambiguity themselves. 
 
5. Application to seeing-in and other pictorial experience 
 
I propose that seeing-in can be understood as a kind of transparency perception 
governed by laws of scission. That is: 
 
When seeing subject matter in a picture surface, the visible properties of 
the picture surface are experienced as separated into two sets of scission 
properties. One set of properties is attributed to the picture surface, and 
the other to the subject matter.  
 
It will also be useful to apply this to the sections of the picture surface: 
 
The visible properties of a section, S, of the picture surface are separated 
into one set of properties that is attributed to the section of the subject 
matter that S depicts, and another set of properties that is attributed to S. 
 
In both cases, scission accords with the rules that govern transparency perception. So 
the scission properties, subjected to the appropriate kinds of mixture described in the 
previous section, will re-create the stimulus properties. 
 
Let me now turn to the concern that we do not perceive the picture surface as 
transparent. The first thing I should make clear is that my proposal does in fact 
contradict this. This goes against our common sense notion of pictures – that they are 
not experienced like panes of glass. It also goes against Wollheim’s implication and 
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Kulvicki’s explicit avowal: that we are aware not only of the picture surface, but of its 
colour, and indeed, opacity. Now, my proposal does in fact allow that we can also be 
visually aware of the picture surface as being an opaque surface having the colours it 
does in fact have. However this awareness cannot be simultaneous with a visual 
awareness of the depicted subject matter. That is, the full awareness of the picture 
surface, where it occurs, will alternate with the awareness of the surface as 
transparent. Metelli allows for such an alternating awareness in transparency 
perception: “[i]f the region of superimposition [is isolated] (even if it is just by the 
attitude of the observer), then only the [stimulus] color is perceived.”31 So too, if we 
isolate the picture surface, by covering all except a patch of paint, or by moving in 
very closely, or “even if it is just by the attitude of the observer” my proposal allows 
that we can have a visual awareness of the picture surface as coloured and opaque.
32
 
So rather than saying that we are never visually aware of the picture surface as 
opaque, I claim that we cannot at the same time be visually aware of the picture 
surface as opaque, and be aware of the subject matter. 
 
Metelli notes the existence of “limiting cases” of transparency, and these also have 
pictorial counterparts. He states: “If all the color goes to the transparent layer, it 
becomes opaque. If all the color goes to the underlying surface, then the transparent 
layer becomes invisible. Transparency is perceived only when there is a distribution 
of the stimulus color to both the transparent layer and the opaque layer.”33 In the first 
pictorial counterpart, no properties are attributed to the subject matter; the surface 
remains opaque in its appearance, not just intermittently, as discussed above, but 
permanently, and so neither seeing-in nor pictorial understanding occur. This is 
therefore a kind of pictorial failure; we would merely see the surface as it actually is. 
In the second pictorial counterpart, all the picture surface’s visible properties are 
attributed to the subject matter, and the viewer loses all visual awareness of the 
picture surface. The picture surface will seem to have something of the quality of a 
clear pane of non-reflecting glass through which the subject matter is seen. Neither of 
these experiences are twofold, and so neither are examples of transparency or seeing-
in. However, I will talk about the latter case in detail since it is predicted by my 
account, and because some pictures do occasion this experience. Clear instances are 
pictures that tend to occasion a mistaken belief in the viewer that they are in fact in 
the presence of the subject matter, such as some trompe l’oeil. As Dominic Lopes 
notes, “trompe l’oeil demonstrates that what it is like to see an object in a picture need 
not be discontinuous with what it is like to see that object in plain sight.”34 Other 
kinds of pictures can also preclude visual awareness of the picture surface per se. 
Certain Dutch and Flemish paintings (such as those of Jan van Eyck) have facture that 
can be imperceptible to ordinary vision, and the same can be true of colour 
photographs with a fine grain. These do not tend to deceive us (we know they are in 
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perception as alternating between awareness of the picture surface and 
awareness of the subject matter. (E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in 
the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, London: Phaidon Press, 1960, pp. 
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fact a flat, manufactured surface), but especially at a distance they can preclude visual 




Let me consider in detail one such case, the reproduction of the photographic image 
of a glass of milk that features on various Penguin Modern Classics editions of 
Anthony Burgess’s novel A Clockwork Orange (supplementary fig. 2). The milk is 
depicted by a white, or slightly grey colour. Here my claim is that this colour is 
wholly attributed to the subject matter – the milk – which appears as if a little behind 
the picture surface. While we have this experience, the picture surface appears as if it 
lacks all its colour properties, that is, it appears wholly transparent. Note that in this 
case, and in others I will consider below, my claim is not that we see different colours 
when we alternate between a visual awareness of only the picture surface, and a visual 
awareness that incorporates the subject matter. Rather, we attribute the same colour to 
different objects – we experience the white colour as belonging to the picture surface 
in the first instance, and in the second instance, to the subject matter’s surface, to the 
milk. 
 
The difference between these two experiences can be directly compared. Various 
versions of the cover include in the design a strip of white above or below the 
photograph, or in a later version white text overlaying the photograph. In all cases this 
white is a similar (sometimes slightly brighter) colour to that which depicts the milk, 
but it has no depictive content; we see it only as a feature of the surface of the cover 
design or text. Compare this to the white colour we see the milk as having. In these 
two cases, we experience much the same colour, but attribute it to a different object. 
My claim is that when visually aware of the milk, we have no visual awareness of the 
white as belonging to the picture surface, as we do when we examine the white stripes 
or text of the cover design. Rather, the white colour appears pushed back a little way 
into the virtual space of the picture, attached to the surface of the milk rather than the 
book cover. 
 
It could be objected that we do retain an awareness of the surface as white and 
opaque. I would agree with this, but with the crucial qualification that this awareness 
is not at that moment part of one’s visual experience. Consider here the glass depicted 
in the photograph through which the milk is seen. Where it lies over the area of the 
milk’s surface that I am concerned with it is quite transparent: we have no visual 
awareness of it. I suggest that our visual experience of the subject matter through the 
picture surface is comparable to the visual experience of seeing the milk through the 
glass. We seem to see the milk through the picture surface just as we seem to see it 
through the surface of the glass. What is markedly different in the experiences of 
these things is not part of the visual phenomenology, but of other kinds of awareness. 
We know of the presence of both surfaces (through various contextual cues, our prior 
experiences and so on); we are aware of what kinds of surfaces they are and where 
they are; but in neither case do we have a visual awareness of the surface.  
 
6. Case studies 
  
I now turn to examples of seeing-in, starting with relatively straightforward cases, and 
progressing to more complex and challenging examples for my proposal. In addition 
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to the expected instances of twofold perception, we shall on closer inspection find 
among them further examples of “onefold” picture perception.  
 
(i) A glossy photograph 
 
The flat, glossy surface of a photograph, or of other pictures, such as the book cover, 
will under certain viewing conditions have a reflective shine to part of the surface, 
through which one can nevertheless make out the picture’s subject matter. The effect 
of such partial reflection is no longer like looking through non-reflective transparent 
glass, but usually like looking through a white veil or mist. Here, the colour 
associated with the reflection is usually attributed to the picture surface, while the 
other colours are attributed to the subject matter. Partially reflected light will produce 
a fusion mixture between its colours and those of the reflective surface (since it 
involves the mixture of light). So this example straightforwardly accords with a law of 
scission, for a fusion mixture of the scission colours will here recreate the stimulus 
colour. 
 
(ii) A sepia photograph 
 
I take it that a sepia toned photograph will usually be experienced not as depicting 
yellowish subject matter, but as being non-committal about its subject’s hues. The 
experience can be likened to that of seeing the subject matter through a filter-like 
device that translates all the hues into corresponding shades of yellow.
36
 Here the 
picture surface’s hue (that is, yellow) is attributed to the picture surface, while the 
surface’s tonal properties are attributed to subject matter. This example also 
straightforwardly accords with the laws of scission, for a subtractive mixture of 
yellow with an appropriate variety of white, black and grey tonal properties will result 




(iii) Paintings with visible brushstrokes. 
 
This is a more complex case, but it is also a crucial one for my proposal, since the 
experience of paintings with visibly impasted brushwork are a typical Wollheimian 
example of seeing-in.  
 
My account here has two parts. The first is the obvious one implied by my proposal: 
that we experience the brushstrokes’ colours as belonging to the subject matter, while 
their textures are attributed to the picture surface. Seeing-in here involves an 
awareness of the brushstrokes covering the picture surface as transparent textures 
through which the colours of the subject matter are seen. The experience, visually, is 
like seeing the subject matter through textured glass. 
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37
 I do not want to suggest that sepia photographs depict things as black, white or 
grey. To be black, white or grey is to lack hue, and so is committal about hue. But 
sepia photographs (and black and white photographs for that matter) do not depict 
their subject matter as lacking hue (i.e. as depicting a black and white world). Rather 
they are silent about what hues their subject matter has. Formatted: Font: 12 pt
 I think it is clear that we do experience certain parts of some pictures in this way. The 
effect is readily observed when the subject matter is not itself textured. For instance, 
when a clear blue sky is painted with visibly discernible blue brushstrokes, the blue of 
the sky appears as if seen through a textured, but otherwise perfectly transparent 
surface. [This can be seen in supplementary figure 3. So far as one can see a clear 
blue sky in such an image, the textured effects of the brushstrokes will be seen as a 
textured, transparent surface through which that sky is seen.] Occasionally the entire 
surface of a painting can promote this textural scission. Those with a thick, broadly 
brushed undercoat and a thinly painted picture over the top can achieve this effect. 
The effect is most clearly seen in a context, somewhat outside painting, where it is 
achieved systematically: in certain kinds of mass produced prints, such as the “oilette” 
postcards published by Raphael Tuck & Sons in the early twentieth century 
[supplementary fig. 4]. These are reproductions of paintings, printed on card 
embossed with a brushstroke pattern. The embossed pattern of brushstrokes gives the 
impression of a transparent texture through which the subject matter of the reproduced 
painting is seen. 
 
However, most paintings do not afford such experiences. The brushwork in many 
paintings, such as Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul (1661, 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) [supplementary figure 5], appears for the most part not as 
a transparent surface, but as closely imbricated with the subject matter it depicts. The 
second part of my analysis is addressed to this. Watanabe and Cavanagh, in their work 
on the perception of texture transparency, identify conditions under which scission 
does and does not occur.
38
 Of interest here, when elements of overlapping textures 
line up with one another and are of the same size, scission tends to be resisted, and the 
viewer instead is more likely to perceive a single composite texture at the area of 
overlap. In figure 4, the left hand diagram shows this phenomenon, while the diagram 







Figure 4. Watanabe and Cavanagh, details from fig. 5, p. 296. 
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Comment [H1]: In fig. 4, we don’t 
see the composite texture as belonging 
to one of the two squares.  
 
Yet, when you draw a parallel with 
Rembrandt you do claim that the 
composite texture is seen as belonging 
to the subject matter and not the 
surface of the painting.  
 
Isn’t this an important disanalogy? 
(The two squares are supposed to be 
the equivalent of the surface and the 
subject matter of a painting, right?) 
 
In relation to this: when scission is 
resisted, as in the left hand figure, it 
makes it more difficult to see the entire 
squares as overlapping. Yet, in the 
case of Rembrandt, as you point out, 
the fact that scission is resisted in 
certain areas does not prevent 
transparency perception in other areas.   
The relation of the embossed brushstrokes of the oilette with the depicted textures of 
its subject matter satisfies Watanabe and Cavanagh’s conditions for scission. The 
embossed brushstrokes, readily apparent, especially in raking light, are much larger 
than the depicted textural elements (clumps of foliage, puffs of cloud, in a typical 
Tuck & Sons image), and rather than being oriented the same way, they cut across 
them. Accordingly, we tend to experience the textures of the embossed brushstrokes 
as belonging to a transparent surface, through which the finer textures of the subject 
matter itself are seen. The painting of a patch of blue sky or a smooth surface allows a 
similar analysis, since the texture of the painting is wholly unrelated to lack of texture 
the subject matter. 
 
The Rembrandt provides a contrasting example. The brushstrokes, in terms of size, 
shape and orientation, often function as equivalents for the textures of the depicted 
subject matter. They do not reproduce the texture of the subject matter in any exacting 
way – indeed they remain recognizably the textures of brushstrokes – but they present 
a comparable ‘grain’, and run in the same direction as the textures of the subject 
matter. Most prominently, the long curving folds of the turban Rembrandt wears are 
depicted with long curving brushstrokes. His brushstrokes also follow the wrinkles of 
his forehead, the individual strokes often matched to individual bulges of flesh, and 
the curls of his hair are traced with similarly curling lines of paints. 
At the same time that the paint’s texture is used in this way, Rembrandt also 
manipulates tone to depict textures. This is done in the familiar way that other kinds 
of forms are modelled using tone: illuminated parts of the texture are rendered using a 
lighter tone, and shaded parts in a darker tone. Now, a critical point: to a significant 
degree the marks used to lay down these areas of tone and the textural marks I have 
discussed are the same marks. That is, in the process of creating the patterns of tone 
that depict textural qualities, Rembrandt lays down these textural marks. 
 
Watanabe and Cavanagh’s work suggests that we should not be surprised to find that 
this combination of techniques acts to resist textural scission. Where tone and texture 
are laid down in the same strokes, as we see in those sections of Rembrandt’s self-
portrait that I have mentioned, the elements of the depicted texture and actual texture 
will be similar in size and orientation, and so they are attributed to a single surface, 
that of the subject matter.
40
 Here the textures of the paint appear imbricated with the 
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 There is also an important disanalogy between the textural transparency described 
by Watanabe and Cavanagh, and our perception of the Rembrandt. In fig. 4, we do not 
tend to see the composite texture as belonging to one of the two squares; rather it 
appears to belong to a third surface. But with the Rembrandt, the composite texture 
does not give us a visual awareness of such a third surface that is neither the surface 
of the picture nor that of the subject matter. In this case we have an awareness of only 
the single composite texture, and we experience this as occupying the space of the 
subject matter. 
 
This is partly related to the fact that picture surface and subject matter appear to 
precisely overlap. Hence the composite texture we in a Rembrandt perceive does not 
sit side by side its components as in fig 4.; rather it entirely incorporates them. That 
still leaves the question of why we should see this composite texture as within the 
picture space, rather than (say) on the picture surface. I will leave this detail 
unexplained here, as I don’t see that Watanabe and Cavanagh’s account – developed 
Formatted: Comment Text
subject matter in its own space. This creates the appearance of a composite texture, 
comprised of the texture that the picture is depicted as having through the 
manipulation of tone, and the texture of the paint, which we also attribute to the 
depicted surface.
41
 More needs to be said about what the experience of imbrication is 
like, and how it relates to the experience of the individual components. I return to 
these questions in section 7. For now, note that my analysis shows that this kind of 
experience is, contra Wollheim, not twofold. Where paint texture is seen not as a 
feature of the picture surface, but as imbricated with subject matter, there is no 
twofoldness, and no seeing-in. 
 
To sum up, for paintings with textured brushwork, my proposal is that pictorial 
experience involves either one or other of the two kinds of experience I have 
described. Different parts of the same painting may sustain different kinds of 
experience (perhaps the more summarily painted parts of Rembrandt’s self-portrait, 
such as the background, act in the first way.) My proposal also allows that the 
experience of a single part of a picture, depending on the attitude of the viewer, can 




(iv) Pictures in a “flat” style 
 
I have in mind here Post-impressionist paintings such as those of Gauguin, 
Synthetism and Cloissonnism, many of the mature paintings of Matisse, Romanesque 
and Byzantine painting, and pictures made in stained glass (provided the glass is 
translucent or opaque). The surfaces of these pictures have in common simple, clearly 
defined shapes made up of large areas of “flat” relatively unmodulated colour. I find it 
is with these pictures more than others that it is tempting to say that one does have a 
simultaneous perception of surface and subject matter. Take the famous stained glass 
window in Canterbury Cathedral Adam Delving. [supplementary figure 6] It is easy to 
accept that we remain visually aware of the pieces of glass fastened into the irregular 
lattice of lead while at the same time seeing Adam labouring away in his brilliantly 
coloured Eden. But that would contradict my proposal – so what can I say about such 
examples? 
 
The key to overcoming this concern lies in understanding that the subject matter 
depicted in these pictures does not have a fully realized three-dimensional character. 
Rather the depicted surfaces appear flattened and oriented towards the picture surface, 
and the space which the depicted objects occupy seems shallow. Objects appear to 
overlap one another rather like flat cut-out shapes in a shallow stage set. There is no 
impression of the depth of, say, Renaissance painting or Rembrandt. The subject 
matter we see in such pictures is already quite picture-like in a sense: it seems to take 
                                                                                                                                           
to account for rather simpler perceptions of texture (in particular, perceptions of flat 
textured surfaces rather than volumetric textured surfaces), provides the resources to 
explain this. 
41
 It is worth adding that this gives the painting a sense of physical presence that it 
would not otherwise have (A photograph of a similar subject lit with similarly 
dramatic, raking light, would not give the same sense of presence as Rembrandt’s 
painting.) 
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 My own sense is that this does happen when brushstrokes only roughly follow 
depicted forms. 
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on much of the flatness of the picture surface, and appear as if pressed up against the 




Once this is understood, it becomes easier to see how the approaches I have already 
worked out apply here. Take Adam Delving again. If we examine our experience of it 
carefully, I believe we will find that it will accord with either one of the two accounts 
I gave in (iii); my own sense even from a photographic reproduction where facture 
can be clearly made out, is that the actual surface seems entirely transparent, and the 
colour and texture properties of the surface go to the subject matter. Because we see 
the subject matter as lying only just behind the picture surface, we do not so readily 
notice that we are “mis-seeing” the surface. Here is a way of testing this claim: while 
maintaining the subject matter in your visual awareness, ask yourself how the pieces 
of glass or (in the case of a painting) the painted shapes on the canvas appear to relate 
to one another. So far as one does succeed in maintaining a visual awareness of the 
subject matter, one will see them as instantiating the depicted spatial relations. That is, 
where a figure is depicted in front of another object, the viewer will see the one area 
of colour as overlapping and slightly in front of the other. In the case of Adam’s pole-
like legs for instance, the translucent glass pieces that depict them usually appear as 
bright but opaque areas of colour (something visible even in reproduction). These 
colours seem to be a little closer than, and overlapping, the blue background. This is a 
misperception of the actual window of course, but to visually experience the real 
relations of the pieces of glass, one must lose awareness if only for a moment of the 
subject matter as having any three-dimensional spatial presence. The window’s parts 
are then reduced in the viewer’s awareness to just what they are, shaped pieces of 
glass that at the most give us the flat outline of legs in a two-dimensional 
arrangement. 
 
(v) Pictures using hatching 
 
Hatching primarily involves the use of multiple, usually roughly parallel lines to 
depict areas of tone. I treat crosshatching, which involves overlaying sets of such 
parallel lines so that they intersect, as a version of hatching here. Hatching is 
primarily used to depict areas of tone, and so is important in modelling three-
dimensional forms. The denser this hatching – that is, the less bare paper is visible – 
the darker the depicted tone will be. (Here I assume that the hatching comprises dark 
marks on light paper.) Hatching is made denser through the application of more 
marks, or by increasing the width of those marks. Seen from a distance, the dark lines 
of ink or pencil are subject to optical fusion, appearing to blend with the exposed pale 
colour of the paper into a smooth homogenous tone. In practice though, we usually 
see prints and drawings at fairly close quarters. Under these conditions, we rarely lose 
visual awareness of the individual lines that make up hatching, but they still occasion 
an experience of tone. It is this simultaneous awareness of hatching and the tones it 
depicts its subject matter as having that I analyse here. 
 
My analysis is comparable to that I made of texture in painting. We may (a) perceive 
the hatching as a web of lines characterising the picture’s surface, through which is 
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seen the subject matter. Or (b) we may perceive the hatching as imbricated with the 
subject matter – that is, translated into the virtual space of the picture, as part of the 
textural warp and weft of the subject matter’s surface. As with painting, different 
parts of a hatched picture’s surface may be experienced in both the ways, and our 
experience of an individual part may also alternate between the two kinds of 
perception, depending on the nature of our attention to the picture. 
 
However, hatching requires a more complicated analysis than painterly brushwork 
because much of it depends for its depictive effect on subjective phenomena. This can 
be most readily appreciated by considering how an area of hatching can serve to 
depict a surface as having a mid-tone. Consider figure 5, which shows a detail of the 
portrait of George Washington on the US one-dollar bill. If one looks at this detail 
from a distance that does not allow optical fusion – and as I have said this is how we 
typically view drawings and prints – we retain an awareness of the darkness of the 
hatched marks themselves and the lightness of the paper in between those marks. 
Now, there is nothing in the experience of the marks in themselves that corresponds to 
the mid-tones of say, Washington’s face. If the viewer stands at some distance, this 
problem is solved by optical fusion, whereby the pattern of light and dark of ink and 
paper is processed by the visual system in such a way that it becomes invisible, and a 
pattern of mid-tones is instead perceived. But how does this pattern of dark and light 
serve to produce a mid-tone at closer quarters, where the pattern of the hatching 
remains visible? There is no doubt that there is a subjective effect at work here. 
Compare the tone of the wisps of white hair (especially on the right of this image), 
with the general tone of Washington’s face. The face seems darker than the hair. But 
if one looks more closely at the image to find the source of this effect, a curious 
phenomenon becomes apparent. Compare the paper on which the hair is depicted with 
that on which Washington’s face appears: the former seems not white but slightly 
grey in comparison to the white of the paper on which the hair is depicted. This is an 
optical illusion, as can be verified by inspection at even closer quarters (under a 
magnifying glass for instance): the paper on which it is printed is of a uniformly light 
tone. This illusion is a kind of “spreading” effect, as it is termed in perceptual 
psychology.
44
 In the case of hatching this would make the dark hatched marks seem 
lighter than they actually are, and (more strikingly) make the light, unmarked paper 
seem darker than it actually is – just as we have seen occurs in the picture of 
Washington. 
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tones are interspersed: the colours or tones are perceived as more similar to one 
another than they otherwise would be. (Ralph Merrill Evans, Introduction to Color, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1948, p. 181.) The Bezold effect is sometimes 
described as the opposite of simultaneous contrast, which results from the juxtaposing 
of larger regions of colour. 
 
 
Figure 5. US one-dollar bill, detail. 
 
A spreading effect can produce not just a single tone, as it clearly does here, but all 
the variations of tone needed to make a depiction. This can be readily seen in another 
print, which will also provides an example of experience (a), that is, an experience of 
the hatching as a web of lines characterising the picture’s surface, through which the 
subject matter is seen. The print is Claude Mellan’s remarkable engraving The 
Sudarium, or Veil of St Veronica (1694) (fig. 6).
45
 Mellan’s form of hatching is 
notable for a number reasons. Though it does not bear directly on my discussion, this 
image is famous for being composed of a single line, that spirals outwards from the 
point depicting the tip of Christ’s nose. Note too that it is not variation of the density 
of the lines that is used to indicate changes in light and darkness, but solely the 
variation in the width of the line used. Mellan’s self-imposed constraint means that for 
the most part the spiral of the line is quite unrelated to the forms it depicts. Its 
thickening and thinning aside, the line passes indifferently over the varying contours 
and discontinuities of the depicted forms. 
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Figure 6. Claude Mellan, The Sudarium, or Veil of St Veronica, 1694, detail. 
 
For reasons mentioned above, this would seem likely to give rise to a scission effect, 
and indeed it can do so. If one focuses on the beginning of the spiral, from a close 
viewpoint, much of the inner part of the spiral can be held in the visual awareness. At 
the same time, between the spiralling line – that is, on the unmarked part of the 
picture surface – the somewhat ghostly form of the depicted face can be seen. The 
effect appears best in the periphery of vision. Fixating on a particular area tends to 
dispel the effect at that point: so, looking right at the start of the spiral on the nose of 
Christ, it appears merely to be a curling line on blank paper, but around that spot, 
away from the centre of one’s vision, the form of Christ’s face appears as if present 
behind the spiral. 
 
Again this involves a subjective effect, for the paper itself, in between the printed 
lines, is quite blank. The broadening of the line causes a subjective darkening of the 
adjacent white area, creating the impression of smoothly varying areas of tone. While 
this seems to be a kind of spreading effect, it also appears to differ from the Bezold 
effect (as I mention below). The following observations are therefore tentative. Two 
features of this experience seem to me especially notable. First, the face itself seems 
relatively pale – more so than it appears at a distance from which the lines optically 
fuse into a continuous tone. Second, and perhaps more curious, so long as one 
maintains the visual awareness of the forms of the face, the spiral line appears to be 
fairly constant in width. That is, while we have a clear visual awareness of the line, 
we lack a clear visual awareness of its broadening and thinning. The broadening out 
of the line seems to have been “displaced”, contributing now to the spreading effect. 
 
Whatever else can be said about these two phenomena, they can be related by the law 
of scission, provided we accept one assumption: that the overall luminance of the 
picture surface is maintained, or largely maintained, by the spreading effect.
46
 Under 
that assumption, the thickening of the line evades visual awareness because its 
constituent tone is subjectively spread into the adjacent areas in between the spiralling 
line, and attributed to the forms of Christ’s face. The face appears relatively pale 
because it is only the tone associated with the thickening of the line that is attributed 
to the subject matter. It appears rather darker at a distance, because through optical 
fusion, the spiral’s overall darkness, rather than just that part expended in the 
spreading effect, is assimilated to the face. 
 
However, as I have said, hatching rarely produces such an experience of scission, 
Instead it is an experience of kind (b) that is typical, and this can be seen clearly in the 
picture of Washington. Here, as in most hatched pictures, line is used in ways that 
trace the contours, planes and textures of the subject matter rather than cutting across 
them. In the portrait of Washington lines follow the strands of his hair, “bracelet” 
shading follows the rounded contours of his face, stippling is suggestive of its texture, 
and a group of near vertical parallel lines on the left side of his face define the plane 
bounded by cheekbone, chin and jawline. Much as the textural effects of Rembrandt’s 
painting are attributed to the subject matter, so the tonal complex of hatching is 
attributed to the subject matter it depicts, forming a composite surface texture with 
whatever spreading effects it gives rise to.
47
 Sometimes the effect is odd, as when 
parts of Washington’s face, the nose, the forehead, appear tightly wrapped in a “net” 
of hatching. But the printmaker has gone to much effort to avoid this effect obtruding, 
by adapting the size, shape and orientation of their hatching to the texture of the 
depicted surface, using, in particular, finer marking and, even stippling in depicting 
Washington’s face. But as with painted texture, such an effect is never quite life-like: 
it is always some composite of the forms and textures established faintly by spreading 
effects, and the perceived “surplus” of the hatched lines. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that neither experiences of kind (a) or (b) are experiences 
of transparency. In the former, as I have said, the effect is as of looking through gaps 
between the hatching – in the case of The Sudarium, it is like looking through the 
gaps between the spiral, somewhat like looking through black lace to see a face 
beyond. The experience is therefore not twofold. In the latter case the hatching is 
experienced not as part of the picture surface at all, but as imbricated with the subject 
matter in the virtual space of the pictures. So, much as with the Rembrandt, there is no 
twofoldness. Nevertheless, both kinds of experience accord with, and are illuminated 
by, laws of scission. 
 
(vi) Pictures that are physically transparent 
 
                                                 
46
 This is on the face of it not implausible, since other subjective effects, such as 
optical fusion and the scission of transparency perception, maintain luminance. 
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 My account requires that these spreading effects generate apparent textures that 
satisfy Watanabe and Cavanagh’s conditions for achieving imbrication with the 
hatched marks. Spreading effects can produce quite effective textural effects (observe 
Christ’s moustache in The Sudarium). But perhaps the difficulties of satisfying these 
conditions account for the “odd” effects I describe, where imbrication is incompletely 
achieved. 
Some pictures, most notably those in certain stained glass windows, are physically 
transparent. I will avoid the example of stained glass here though, since as in the case 
of Adam Delving it is usually designed so that things are not clearly visible on the 
other side of it, not least through the use of translucent rather than transparent glass. 
So take instead a pane of coloured glass, on to which is printed in transparent grey ink 
a photographic image. One could think of it as a transparent version of the sepia 
photograph I discussed above. If this glass is set into a window frame, we will be able 
to see things through it, and perhaps with a little concentration we will be able to 
maintain a visual awareness of the scene on the other side of the glass, while it 
continues to function as a picture – that is, while we are also simultaneously aware of 
the depicted subject matter and the coloured glass. The worry here is how a picture 
surface can appear transparent as the thesis of this paper holds, when it is already 




This example can be successfully tackled once one understands that psychological 
accounts of transparency perception allow for the perception of what we maywhat I 
shall call multiple transparency. So, in double transparency, we will perceive two 
overlapping transparent surfaces, and see through both of them to an opaque surface. 
In doing so we simultaneously maintain a visual awareness of the two transparent 
surfaces and the opaque surface (fig. 7). In such cases a more complex scission 
occurs, the stimulus colour being divided between three surfaces where the three 
surfaces overlaprather than two. 
. 
 
[insert fig.]  
 
 
Figure 7. Double transparency 
 
In the case of our example, we remain aware of features of the glass such as its 
reflective shine and its hue. As with the sepia photograph, we attribute its tonal values 
to the depicted subject matter. And we see at the same time the scene behind the glass. 
The subject matter will typically appear behind the glass, and the scene visible 
through the glass will typically appear behind the subject matter. The glass and 
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 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this concern. 
depicted subject matter will both appear as transparent, and through them both we will 




It is also notable that this pictorial experience, and the visual experience figure 7 
occasions, are no longer twofold. They involve experiences in which three (rather 
than two) visible surfaces appear to overlap without occlusion. That is, they are 
threefold. One can find further examples of threefold experience involving pictures. I 
will not analyse them here, but consider for example, a picture of a transparent object 
(say a coloured glass vase) through which other depicted objects can be seen. Or, in 
certain circumstances, a picture that depicts another picture: we may be visually 
aware of the apparently transparent surface of the picture, through which we see the 
apparently transparent surface of the depicted picture, through which we see the 
depicted picture’s subject matter.50 
 
(vii) Pictures depicting subject matter that appears to project from the picture 
surface 
 
All my examples so far have dealt with subject matter that appears to lie behind the 
picture surface. But as Wollheim says, subject matter can also appear to project from 
a picture’s surface. How does transparency figure in our experience of such pictures? 
I have an elegant response to this question. Let me use as an example a chalk drawing 
by the pavement artist Julian Beever, Pre-Modernist and Post-Modernist.
51
 
[supplementary figure 7] Working on a paved mall, Beever uses anamorphic 
projection techniques to give the impression that a large rectangle of bricks has been 
removed from the pavement. The missing bricks are drawn so they appear assembled 
in a nearby stack, reminiscent of Carl Andre’s infamous Minimalist sculpture 
Equivalent VIII. Standing at precisely the right viewpoint the depicted bricks appear 
to sit atop the surface on which they are in fact drawn, and one might get the uncanny 
sense that Andre, or some errant council workers, have been labouring here. But 
though its technique is trompe l’oeil in this sense, as a chalk drawing it is unlikely to 
genuinely “trick the eye”. Indeed, as is generally the case with pavement drawings, 
one can readily discern traces of the pavement beneath the drawing: both the furrows 
between the pavers, and their rough surface texture remain visible throughout the 
chalk drawing. 
 
Part of the experience this work occasions is now familiar: where the gap in the 
pavement is depicted, the actual pavement (that is, the picture surface) appears 
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 Another possibility, especially if there are objects only just behind the glass, is that 
these may appear to be in front of the subject matter. My expectation, drawn from 
analysis in (vii), is that where a physically opaque object seems to lie in front of the 
subject matter, the opaque object will appear transparent and the subject matter will 
appear opaque. 
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 I suppose there must be some limit to how many folds a perception may have (how 
many panes of overlapping coloured glass can one see through while still maintaining 
awareness of the individual surfaces?). Still, it seems likely that we can perceive even 
more “folds” than I have considered here. I thank an anonymous referee for 
suggesting the possibility of such “multi-fold” perception. 
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 Photographic documentation is on Beever’s website 
(http://users.skynet.be/J.Beever/postmod.htm). 
transparent. In photographic documentation of the work, one especially remains aware 
of the furrows in the pavement, which, chalked over for the most part, take on a faint 
transparent presence through which is seen the sandy space beneath the pavement. It 
is the other part of the chalk drawing, that depicting the bricks, which provides the 
answer to my question: here one sees the pavement surface through the depicted pile 
of bricks. The depicted bricks have a ghostly, almost glassy presence through which 
features of the actual pavement, especially the grid of the furrows between the bricks, 
remain dimly visible. This phenomenon of transparent subject matter is commonplace 
in anamorphic chalk drawings, but it has a presence in fine art too. As I have 
mentioned, the most famous of anamorphoses, the skull in the foreground of 
Holbein’s The Ambassadors, appears to float some distance in front of the canvas 
when viewed from the correct vantage point. So far as one can simultaneously keep in 
the visual awareness both the depicted skull, and the sleek texture of the paint that 
depicts it, the skull also takes on this transparent quality. That is, one has the 
experience of seeing through the skull to the painting’s surface. So, my proposal 
needs a simple adjustment when subject matter appears to project from the picture 
surface. In these cases, rather than seeing the subject matter through the seemingly 
transparent picture surface, we see the surface through the seemingly transparent 
subject matter. 
 
7. Imbrication and inflection 
 
I return now to the experience of imbrication, to clarify the phenomenon, and to show 
how it relates to a similar concept, inflection, which has attracted attention in the 
recent philosophical literature on pictures. I have used the term imbrication to indicate 
the appearance of a picture’s subject matter when certain visible features of the 
picture surface (the texture of brushwork, and visible hatching) are attributed to the 
surface of the subject matter rather than the picture. As I have said, these features then 
appear “imbricated” with the features of the subject matter depicted by more 
conventional means (especially tonal modelling). For clarity, I will discuss only the 
imbrication of paint texture below, but I expect much the same can be said about 
imbrication of hatching.  
 
What is the experiential character of imbrication? I have claimed that it is an 
experience of composite texture, drawing the idea from Watanabe and Cavanagh. But 
what does such an experience amount to? Watanabe and Cavanagh’s work provides 
less guidance here – their paper implies that experience of composite textures is 
possible, but they do not give a description of it. So let me venture a description 
myself. Consider an example: the depiction by a painter of hair. Often a painter will 
not attempt to depict hairs individually. Instead she follows the general direction of 
the hair with the brush, giving a texture that gives some suggestion of individual hairs 
(through the texture left by the bristles of the brush), their length (through the length 
of brushstrokes) and their shape (which the brushstrokes and bristle marks follow). At 
the same time, the painter varies the tones of these brushstrokes. Partly this tonal 
variation models the general volumes that the hair fills, much as other forms are 
depicted using tone. But it also serves to depict features of the hair’s texture: darker 
tones mark the shadows where locks of hair separate from one another, and lighter 
tones indicate where the light catches it.  
 
We experience these not as two textures – the actual texture of the paint, and the 
texture represented by tonal variation – but as a single texture, the texture of the 
depicted hair. It seems to me that this apparent texture is produced according to the 
following rule, or one much like it. Consider texture as a raised pattern that is applied 
to an object’s surface. Two such patterns – call these component textures – can be 
applied one over the top of the other, and the result will be a third texture. I suggest 
that we experience the composite texture as a single texture that is the outcome of 
such a process. According to Watanabe and Cavanagh there must be a similarity in 
size and orientation of the marks for a composite texture to be perceived, so it follows 
that the experience of the composite will tend to be a strengthened version of its 
components. That is, a visible multiplication of textural elements will occur, and 
where individual textural elements overlap, they will appear to fuse and obtrude 
further. This seems a good account of the experience that the use of texture in painting 
hair yields. The texture of the paint enriches the texture depicted using tone: more 
fibres seem visible, and the sense of relief is accentuated. 
 
It will be asked, how does our experience of such a composite texture allow us to 
distinguish the separate contributions of real texture, and tonal modelling? My 
account allows that while we apprehend the texture as a single texture, we can 
recognize aspects of the composite texture as having the texture of paint rather than 
that of the subject matter. The texture of the brushstrokes needs to satisfy Watanabe 
and Cavanagh’s conditions of orientation and size, but otherwise does not need to be 
much like the actual texture of the depicted subject for imbrication to occur. So in 
contributing to the experience of the composite texture, it also retains its visibly 
brushstroked appearance. That is to say, the subject matter appears to take on textural 
properties of the paint (an effect that aligns imbrication with inflection, as will be 
clear below). 
 
Note too, that as I have discussed in section 5, this experience can alternate with a 
visual awareness of the medium as medium, but in doing so the viewer loses 
awareness of the subject matter. In this case we see the paint’s tonal and textural 
properties as they in fact are. Together these points allow for a rather richer 
experience of a painting than might at first be apparent on my account. For instance: if 
we visually fasten on to a brushstroke, and step back, we can retain the awareness of 
the brushstroke’s texture as our awareness of its association with the surface ebbs, and 
it appears to become imbricated with the subject matter. 
 
I now look at how this account relates to inflection. Inflection describes the 
experience of a picture in which a picture’s subject matter is inflected with qualities of 
the medium. For Hopkins, inflection occurs when “what is seen in a surface includes 
properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s 
design (conceived as such).”52 Michael Podro, on whom Hopkins draws, finds an 
example of this in Veronese’s Unfaithfulness (c. 1575, National Gallery, London), 
observing that “the sense of the brush across the heavy weave canvas intimates the 
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 Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance’, in 
Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on 
Depiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 158. 
physical immanence of the woman’s back.”53 The woman’s skin appears to take on 
the qualities of the painted surface which inflect the sense of form that Veronese 
achieves through the more standard means of tonal modelling. On the basis of this, 





However, Hopkins argues that inflection presents two challenges for what he calls 
divisive accounts of seeing-in, of which mine is, in a sense, an example.
55
 I will show 
how my approach escapes these challenges, but first I will need to explain the 
distinction Hopkins has made between divisive and unitary accounts of seeing-in.
56
 
All accounts of seeing-in will make a distinction of content: between the experience 
of the picture surface and the subject matter seen-in it. However there is a question, as 
Hopkins puts it, of “whether the distinction between the two dimensions of content in 
pictorial experience is taken to correspond to any further divide in its nature.”57 
Divisive accounts hold that it does; unitary accounts maintain that it does not. My 
account is thus a divisive one, in so far as it analyses seeing-in as a matter of being 
aware of one layer (subject matter) through another (the picture surface), and implies 
that we could, at least conceivably, have such awarenesses independently of one 
another. The first problem that inflection presents for divisive accounts is this. 
Divisive accounts imply that when inflection occurs the picture surface will feature 
twice in our experience of the picture: we will be simultaneously aware of both the 
picture surface itself, and of the subject matter as inflected with the properties of the 
picture surface. Hopkins is right to point out that this does not reflect our actual 
experience of pictures. As he says of a Rembrandt drawing, the “ink strokes do not 
figure twice over” in our visual awareness.58 But as I describe in the previous section, 
when imbrication occurs, the pictorial experience is onefold. That is, one does not 
experience the texture as being of the picture surface; instead it is experienced just 
once, as a feature of the subject matter. Thus my account is not vulnerable to this 
criticism.  
 
Hopkins’ second objection is complex, so let me extract from it that part that 
challenges my approach. Hopkins writes, 
 
Anything bearing inflected properties is not just an unusual sort of entity, 
but one that somehow combines aspects drawn from very different orders 
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of reality: the world of design and the world of scenes visible in design. 
Can Standard Visual Representation offer us that? Until we have a 
satisfactory answer, the divisive account is threatened … .59 
 
Hopkins’ concern is that it is difficult to see how the two aspects of seeing-in can be 
combined when a divisive account typically begins (as mine does) by stressing that 
they are best understood as akin to ordinary face-to-face visual experience, (Standard 
Visual Representation as Hopkins calls it). But I have addressed this issue above, 
where I gave an account of the experience of imbrication as the experience of a 
composite texture. So we have seen already that an understanding of ordinary visual 
experience does indeed give us the resources to describe the experience of 
imbrication. 
 
Inflection also raises a question about the significance of my position for the aesthetic 
value of painting. According to Hopkins, for inflection to hold a significant place in 
the philosophy of art,  
 
a certain assumption must be made. This is that the task of an aesthetics of 
pictures is in key part to explain why we value looking at them in ways 
we do not value seeing objects … in the flesh. That immediately gives 





Consider one of Van Gogh’s paintings, A Pair of Shoes (1886, Van Gogh Museum 
Amsterdam) – the old footwear itself is presumably of no aesthetic interest, but the 
painting is. Why is that? It is not, or not just, that we admire the forms presented by 
the painting in themselves, as we might those of an abstract painting. Hopkins (whose 
takes Van Gogh’s painting as his example) and Lopes points out that inflection seems 
to give an answer: it is our perception of paint and subject matter in relation to one 
another – that is to say, it is the way the boots are inflected by Van Gogh’s brushwork 
that we dwell over when we admire the painting. Inflection could then take on the 





This line of thinking presents a challenge for me. As I have described the experience 
of imbrication, it is reasonable to expect that this phenomenon draws our attention and 
can provide pleasure. But can it be as important as Hopkins suggests? I am doubtful 
that it needs to be. In the case of a painting of aesthetically nugatory subject matter, 
such as Van Gogh’s boots, we may expect that imbrication is the sole source of 
aesthetic pleasure. But we should avoid the temptation to overrate this as a source of 
value. For example, it is not clear that A Pair of Boots gets much of its artistic value 
from inflection. While it may get all of its aesthetic quality from that source, its 
primary significance is more likely autobiographical: it is “a memorable piece of his 
own life, a sacred relic”, as art historian Meyer Schapiro put it, rather than an 
                                                 
59
 Hopkins, 2010, p. 174. 
60
 Hopkins, 2010, p. 165. 
61
 Hopkins, 2010, pp. 165–167.; See See also Lopes, 2005, p. 192. 
CHECK??????.Dominic McIver Lopes, Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, ch. 1.   
Formatted: Font: 12 pt





In light of this we might still take inflection to be the source of painting’s distinctive 
aesthetic value as an art, even if in some cases it does not contribute greatly to an 
individual painting’s value as art. But this position is also hard to maintain. Consider 
that much great painting in the Western tradition does not make significant use of 
inflection. Aside from the work of Venetians such as Titian and Veronese, the 
painterliness which is a precondition for inflection had little presence in Renaissance 
and Mannerist painting. It is completely absent in van Eyck, and is seldom to be 
found in Leonardo and Raphael. Though it is prominent in Baroque artists such as 
Rembrandt and Velázquez, there is little of it in the work of painters of the period as 
diverse as Poussin and Caravaggio. It has no significant place in Neoclassical 
painting, including that of David and Ingres. It is really only since Romanticism that it 
becomes a dominant feature of painting. So to maintain that inflection is an 
aesthetically distinctive feature of painting will come at the expense of allowing that 
much aesthetically significant painting does not take advantage of this “distinctive 
feature”. This sacrifices an element of the claim that I take to be integral to it: that is, 
that it illuminates the aesthetic value of all artworks that are paintings. Thus, we 
should not overrate the importance of inflection’s contribution to painting’s value as 
an art. Where it contributes aesthetic value, as in the Van Gogh, it may not contribute 
significantly to the artistic value of the painting. And it does not contribute to the 
aesthetic value of many of the most aesthetically significant paintings. 
 
8. What seeing-in is 
 
I should first repeat that seeing-in describes fewer instances of pictorial experience 
than Wollheim thought. Examples where we experience imbrication of subject matter 
and the marks that depict it are the prime Wollheimian examples of seeing-in that I 
reject. However, these examples accord with, and are illuminated by, the laws of 
scission, as are other examples of pictorial experience that Wollheim does not treat, 
including illusion and trompe l’oeil.  
 
Let me now state a clear account of seeing-in in terms of transparency perception. I 
have argued that seeing X in a surface, Y, involves being visually aware of one of 
these as being transparent, and seeing the other through it. The experience of Y is 
never an experience of it as having all the visible properties that are observed when it 
is seen as surface alone, since seeing-in involves some of these being attributed to the 
subject matter. Aside from this, the experience of Y is a straightforward notion, since 
Y is indeed there. More needs to be said about the experience of X. What does it 
mean to have an experience of an absent object?  
 
Here I want to dispel the suggestion that this experience, qua experience, is different 
in kind to that of ordinary face-to-face seeing. As I conceive it, there is no necessary 
qualitative difference between the two. The only essential point of difference for 
seeing-in is that the visual awareness of X is counterfactually dependent not on the 
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presence of X, as it is in veridical seeing, but on the presence of the surface, Y.
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There are other differences, and though these do not occur invariably, they still call 
for explanation. I identify two here.
64
 The first arises from the fact that we typically 
do not believe we are in the presence of an object we see-in a picture (though 
occasionally we may, as when we are tricked by trompe l’oeil). The worry here is that 
the non-veridical experience of seeing may not be compatible with a belief that X is 
truly present. Reflection on examples of ordinary seeing involving optical illusions 
show that this should not be a concern. To take one example, a viewer aware of the 
bent stick illusion can have a non-veridical visual experience of the half-submerged 
stick as bent, despite simultaneously believing the stick to be straight. Seeing need not 
always be believing. The second difference is that a seen-in object is often 
experienced as having different visible properties than would be apparent to the 
viewer face-to-face with the object. For instance, we do not experience the subject 
matter in a sepia photograph as having properties of hue (which we would ordinarily 
see in life), and a caricature provides an experience of its subject matter as having 
properties (distorted or exaggerated features) that the subject does not have in life. 
Although these particular experiences may be unique to pictures, examples of 
ordinary vision do show that these kinds of experience – in which objects are visually 
experienced as having different properties to those normally available face-to-face – 
are not unique to pictorial experience. In situations where our ability to see is reduced, 
we typically have visual awareness of things without experiencing them as having 
their full gamut of usually visible properties. So, in darkness we may not be able to 
see hues, and in fog we may not see detail. In situations where something (say, a 
person) we have seen before reappears to us, but with changed properties (say, a new 
hairstyle, plastic surgery, etc.), we may still experience it as the same object – that is 
we still recognize it – but we experience it as having new properties.  
 
I thus reject the concern that veridical and non-veridical visual awareness are in some 
way different in kind at the level of experience. It follows that only the concepts of 
transparency perception (as a kind of visual awareness) and veridicality are needed to 
account for seeing-in. That is to say, seeing-in is just a matter of a transparency 
perception incorporating a veridical visual awareness of a surface, and a non-veridical 
visual awareness of an absent object, such that the awareness of the object is 
counterfactually dependent on the presence of the surface. 
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Supplementary figure 1. Luca Signorelli and workshop, The Assumption of the Virgin with Saints 


























Supplementary figure 7. Julian Beever, Pre-Modernist and Post-Modernist, n.d.  
